The dangers lurking in our messy and unpredictable world


Fragilities in the global economic system are real and must be confronted. 6park.com
世界经济有长期驱动因素，也面临冲击、风险和脆弱性，我们该如何应对？



Last week, I discussed five long-term drivers of the world economy — demography, climate change, technological advance, the global spread of knowhow and economic growth itself. This week I will look at shocks, risks and fragilities. Together, I suggest, all these shape the economy in which we live. 6park.com
上周，我讨论了世界经济的五大长期驱动因素——人口、气候变化、技术进步、知识的全球传播和经济增长本身。本周，我将探讨冲击、风险和脆弱性。我认为，所有这些共同塑造了我们所处的经济。 6park.com
      6park.com
A “shock” is a realised risk. Risks, in turn, are almost all conceivable. In Donald Rumsfeld’s helpful phraseology they are “known unknowns”. But their likelihood and severity are unknown. We are surrounded by such risks — further pandemics, social instability, revolutions, wars (including civil wars), mega-terrorism, financial crises, collapses in economic growth, reversals in global economic integration, cyber-disruptions, extreme weather events, ecological collapses, huge earthquakes or eruptions by super-volcanoes. All of these are imaginable. The realisation of one raises the likelihood of at least some of the others. Moreover, known fragilities increase the likelihood or at least the likely severity of such shocks. 6park.com
“冲击”是风险成为现实。而风险几乎都是可以想象的。用唐纳德•拉姆斯菲尔德(Donald Rumsfeld)颇有道理的话说，它们是“已知的未知”。但它们发生的可能性和严重程度是未知的。我们被这种风险所包围——更多的流行病、社会不稳定、革命、战争（包括内战）、超级恐怖主义、金融危机、经济增长崩溃、全球经济一体化逆转、网络中断、极端天气事件、生态崩溃、大地震或超级火山爆发。所有这些都是可以想象的。其中一个风险成为现实，至少会提高其他一些风险成为现实的可能性。此外，已知的脆弱性增加了这类冲击的可能性，或者至少是可能的严重程度。 6park.com
      6park.com
As the Global Risks Report 2024 from the World Economic Forum demonstrates, we live in just such a high-risk world. It is not so much that anything can happen. It is rather that a sizeable number of quite conceivable somethings might happen, possibly at much the same time. The recent past has shown this clearly: we have suffered a pandemic, albeit a relatively mild one by historical standards, two costly wars (in Ukraine and the Middle East), an unexpected surge in inflation and an associated “cost of living crisis”. Moreover, these disturbances followed not long after the multiple financial crises of 2007-15. 6park.com
正如世界经济论坛(WEF)的《2024年全球风险报告》(Global Risks Report 2024)所表明的那样，我们就是生活在这样一个高风险的世界。并不是说什么事情都有可能发生。而是大量可以想象的事情可能发生，而且可能同时发生。最近的历史清楚地表明了这一点：我们经历了一场大流行病，尽管以历史标准来看是相对温和的；经历了两场代价高昂的战争（分别在乌克兰和中东）；经历了意想不到的通胀飙升以及随之而来的“生活成本危机”。而且，这些动荡发生在2007年至2015年的多重金融危机之后不久。 6park.com
      6park.com
Not surprisingly, these shocks have proved damaging and destabilising. They are likely to impose long-term costs, especially on more vulnerable countries and people. But we can see a piece of good fortune: the inflation shock looks likely to fade relatively soon. Consensus forecasts for inflation in 2024 have changed very little since January 2023. In January 2024, they were 2.2 per cent for the eurozone, 2.6 per cent for the US and 2.7 per cent for the UK. Central bankers are mostly desperate to avoid the mistake of loosening too soon and so are far more likely to do so too late. Consensus forecasts for growth in 2024 are consequently low, but not negative, so far. 6park.com
事实证明，这些冲击具有破坏性和造成不稳定，这并不奇怪。它们可能会带来长期成本，尤其是对更脆弱的国家和人民。但我们可以看到一个好消息：通胀冲击看起来可能会相对较快地消退。自2023年1月以来，对2024年通胀的共识预测几乎没有变化。2024年1月，对欧元区通胀的共识预测为2.2%，美国为2.6%，英国为2.7%。央行行长们大多极为希望避免过早放松货币政策的错误，因此更有可能过晚放松货币政策。因此，到目前为止，对2024年经济增长的共识预测较低，但并非为负。 6park.com
      6park.com
The future of the current wars is far more uncertain. They might be resolved, fade away or explode into something bigger and more damaging. Such uncertainty, history tells us, is in the nature of war. Moreover, how they end might — indeed, probably will — create further risks. At one end, there might be peaceful settlements of both conflicts. At the other, there might be a mere pause before still worse hostilities. 6park.com
当前战争未来走向的不确定性高得多。它们可能会得到解决，可能逐渐平息，也可能爆发成更大、更具破坏性的战争。历史告诉我们，这种不确定性是战争的本质。此外，它们的结束方式或许会（实际上是很可能）带来进一步的风险。一方面，两场冲突都可能得到和平解决。另一方面，可能只是出现一个暂停，然后爆发更严重的敌对行动。 6park.com
      6park.com
What happens in the future depends not only on how the driving forces continue to operate, when (and how) recent shocks work themselves out, and which risks are realised. It also depends on the fragilities in the system. Four stand out. 6park.com
未来会发生什么，不仅取决于驱动力量如何继续发挥作用、近期冲击何时（以及如何）自我化解，以及哪些风险成为现实。它还取决于系统的脆弱性。有四大脆弱性非常突出。 6park.com
      6park.com
The first set is environmental. We are engaged in an irreversible experiment with the biosphere, largely, but not exclusively, in relation to climate. As the human economy grows, so is its impact on the biosphere likely to expand, too. It will take a big effort to avoid making the environment still more fragile. So far, we have failed to reverse the trends and so the fragility of the environment will grow. 6park.com
第一个是环境脆弱性。我们正在对生物圈进行一场不可逆转的实验，主要但不完全是与气候有关。随着人类经济的增长，其对生物圈的影响也可能扩大。要避免环境变得更加脆弱，需要付出巨大的努力。到目前为止，我们未能扭转趋势，因此环境的脆弱性将会加剧。 6park.com
      6park.com
The second set is financial. Over time, the quantity of debt, both public and private, has tended to rise. Often, this has been sensible, indeed essential. The difficulty is that people come to rely on both the soundness of their claims and their ability to finance and, when necessary, refinance their debts. Economies rely on the confidence of creditors in their debtors. If anything causes a big shock to such expectations, mass bankruptcy might trigger deep depressions, with ghastly economic and political consequences. With today’s high indebtedness, an extended period of high interest rates might trigger such shocks. 6park.com
第二个是金融脆弱性。随着时间的推移，公共和私人债务的数量趋于上升。这往往是合理的，实际上甚至是必要的。困难在于，人们开始既依赖于他们债权的可靠性，又依赖于他们为债务融资、并在必要时为债务再融资的能力。经济依赖于债权人对债务人的信心。如果有什么事情对这种预期造成重大冲击，那么大规模破产可能引发深度萧条，并带来可怕的经济和政治后果。鉴于目前的高负债水平，长期的高利率可能引发这样的冲击。 6park.com
      6park.com
The third set lies in domestic politics. We are living in what Larry Diamond of Stanford has called a “democratic recession”. There is growing hostility to fundamental norms of liberal democracy, even in western countries. As I have argued elsewhere, this is rooted in economic disappointment, policy failures, and disruptive social changes. That has lowered the legitimacy of conventional politicians and raised that of populist demagogues. This then makes our politics fragile. 6park.com
第三个是国内政治脆弱性。我们正生活在斯坦福大学(Stanford)的拉里•戴蒙德(Larry Diamond)所说的“民主衰退”之中。即使在西方国家，对自由民主基本准则的敌意也越来越大。正如我在其他地方所指出的那样，这种情况的根源在于经济失望、政策失败和破坏性的社会变革。这降低了传统政客的合法性，提高了民粹主义煽动家的合法性。这让我们的政治变得脆弱。 6park.com
      6park.com
The final set lies in geopolitics. The combination of changes in relative economic power with the emergence of a bloc of authoritarian powers centred on China has cemented divisions in the world. These can be seen in today’s conflicts. The resulting distrust threatens our capacity to summon the co-operation needed to secure “prosperity, peace and planet”. In a world in which the dangers of conflict and the cost of failure to co-operate are so great, this final fragility might be the most important. If we do not find a way to co-operate, we are likely to fail to manage many of the risks. That, in turn, will make further big shocks more likely and harder to deal with. 6park.com
最后一个是地缘政治脆弱性。相对经济实力的变化，加上以中国为中心的威权国家集团的崛起，加剧了世界的分歧。这些可以在当今的冲突中看到。由此产生的不信任，威胁到我们为实现“繁荣、和平与地球”可持续发展理念争取所需合作的能力。在一个冲突的危险和合作失败的代价如此巨大的世界里，最后这个脆弱性可能是最重大的。如果我们找不到合作的方式，我们很可能无法管理许多风险。这进而将使进一步的大冲击更有可能发生，也更难以应对。 6park.com
      6park.com
Ours is indeed a messy and unpredictable world. This is not because we do not know anything. On the contrary, we know a great deal. The problem is that we also know that the world is unpredictable and complex. The crucial response must be to reduce fragilities, manage shocks, plan for risks and understand the fundamental drivers. Moreover, since many of these are global, we must think globally, too. Humanity’s habitual myopia and tribalism will not work. Alas, it is hard to imagine we will outgrow them in the near future. 6park.com
我们的世界确实是一个混乱而不可预测的世界。这并不是因为我们什么都不知道。恰恰相反，我们知道得很多。问题是我们也知道世界是不可预测和复杂的。关键的应对措施必须是降低脆弱性、管理冲击、制定风险计划并了解根本驱动因素。此外，由于许多因素是全球性的，我们也必须从全球角度思考。人类习惯性的短视和部落主义是行不通的。可惜，很难想象我们能在不久的将来克服它们。