在欧洲军事史的角度，“排队枪毙”的步兵线战术某种意义上来说是步兵阵战术的延伸。欧洲有着数千年一脉相承的陆战进化套路，从早期的希腊方阵，底比斯的“斜线”阵，到罗马乌龟阵，中世纪重装步兵楔形阵 瑞士长枪兵的Pike and shot战术等等，其核心思路就是步兵们用紧凑的阵型相互保护队友的侧翼，并在正面保有最强的战力输出。在步兵攻防战之中，哪一方能够保护自己的侧翼并能攻击对方的侧翼形成协击，就能占有极大的优势。 文艺复兴之后火器的兴起增强了步兵的战斗力，但并没有从本质上改变步兵阵战术的实质。 6park.com
这里需要“修正”一下一种关于中世纪-近代的远程兵种的不正确认知。很多人认为弓箭手和火枪手面对近身的长矛兵和剑士毫无还手之力，在我看来，这种看法是错误的。远程兵种和近战兵种本身的区别在于所用的武器及其“熟练度”，在战斗中更重要的是阵型和指挥官的战术指挥。没有任何天条规定了一个士兵被定义成为了“远程兵种”之后，他就不能使用和练习近战兵器，也没有任何天条规定“远程步兵”们不能排列成紧密的步兵阵型运用近战兵器与敌军作战。著名的例子是百年战争时期的阿金库尔战役，亨利五世率领着由长弓兵为主的大约5000士兵兵力的军队在阿金库尔遭遇了包含了大量骑士的约2万人的法军主力。此役之初，法军无论在士气，补给，军队的数量与质量上都要优于英军，但是由于地形限制，法国的重装骑兵未能形成动能优势冲撞英军的阵线。很多资料将英军在阿金库尔战役的胜利描述成长弓兵对骑士的胜利，这个描述只有一半是正确的。当天法军对英军共发动了两次总攻，仅有第一次攻击遭到了英军长弓兵的压倒性火力压制，第二次冲击是以肉搏战为主的。当身着重甲的法国骑士气踹嘘嘘的越过沼泽面对近战能力毫不逊色而又以逸待劳的手持战斧的英国长弓兵的时候，法军的最终失败终于来临。此战中法军在与英军近战中倒下的士兵的数量就超过了英军的总数。 6park.com
类似的，对于各式各样的火枪兵来说，即便是没有刺刀，也并不表示他们在近战中会被敌军予取予求。步兵线战术在欧洲“恰好”成熟于燧发枪与刺刀普及之后，这并不表示燧发枪和刺刀是步兵线战术的前提。在欧洲，恰好因为循序渐进的科技自然发展，使得新武器的发明与大规模应用有着滞后性。例如欧洲列强之一的英国直到伊丽莎白一世的后期（1605年）才颁布“禁止长弓法令”，彻底淘汰弓箭兵而使用火枪兵。与之对比，日本自从16世纪初接触到葡萄牙大型帆船“黑船”（史称“第一次黑船”事件）开始引入火绳枪，并在接下来的100年对火绳枪的性能，生产与战法带来了翻天覆地的改进。可以说到16世纪末，日本对火绳枪的运用已经超过了欧洲。大家可以参见我之前写的日本火枪性能考： 6park.com
https://club.6parker.com/chan1/index.php?app=forum&act=threadview&tid=14117220 6park.com
如果将线列步兵定义为"在步兵阵列的前三列全部布置火枪兵进行有序齐射（ranked fire）"的话，那么日本在战国时代早就实现了线列步兵的战法。参见 "The Teppou"(By M.  Baker, Sumarai Archive. )对日本战国时期的长条合战的相关描述 6park.com
https://www.samurai-archives.com/ste.html 6park.com
"                  The teppo taisho waited until the Takeda cavalry made it to the banks of the Rengogawa. The shallow river and its high banks had slowed down the cavalry’s charge. It was at this point that the Oda commanders gave the order to fire. Now most sources give the teppo’s maximum killing range at about 50 meters. Dr. Stephen Turnbull also notes that tests show a 1 in 3 chance of hitting a man-sized target from 50 meters (the Takeda samurai, being mounted on horses and in a slow moving, condensed formation may have gave better odds). Now Oda Nobunaga was noted by Dr. Turnbull as being a master at using firearms, so my hypothesis is Nobunaga estimated the Rengogawa was at a distant where his men could fire and hit a good percent of their slowed targets, and not wasting ammo on blind shots. 
            This initial volley not only injured and killed many samurai, but the loud noise and smoke from the teppo also frightened the charging horses, again slowing the charge, and lowering the Takeda’s offensive capabilities. The gunners “using a volley fire system with three ranks, quickly fired again and again, destroying the Takeda charge” (Ledbetter 2005). Katsuyori sent wave after wave to the Oda lines only to be stopped by the volley fire. Any samurai who made it to the palisade were cut down in isolated groups. For the next three hours the battle at Shitaragahara was the same. Katsuyori would send in waves of cavalry and the Oda troops would repulse them with their teppo. Then the Oda broke from the palisade and engaged Katsuyori’s troops in hand to hand combat. At 1p.m. the Oda troops were ordered back to the palisades allowing the Takeda army to retreat. Though the Takeda generals fought a rearguard defense many Takeda samurai were rundown and killed. Katsuyori managed to make it back to Kai, where the Tokugowa-Oda army had stopped pursuit at the border (Ledbetter 2005). Out of 15,000 troops roughly 2,000 survived (a causality rate of 67%). Included in the list of killed in action were high ranking Takeda Generals, such as Baba Nobufusa, Yamagata Masakage, Sanada Nobutsuna and Sanda Masateru (Ledbetter 2005; West and Seal 2005). 6park.com
            One point this particular battle illustrates is the use of the volley fire system. By having three rows of gunners, each rotating their volley. Where the first line shoots and then reloads, the  second line does the same and finally the third line fires and reloads. By the time the third line fires their shot the first will have already been reloaded, allowing for continuous rate of fire. At Nagashino the Oda troops were able to repel a highly trained and effective Takeda cavalry, utilizing a wooden fence, ashigaru and their guns." 6park.com
此战可以看做在日本战国历史上线列步兵战术最早获得极大战果的战例。织田-德川联军部署了3000铁炮（火绳枪）手站在前三列而用长枪兵保护火枪手的侧翼与后背。此役武田胜赖几乎败光了武田家三代积累的主力骑兵军队。 6park.com
下面给出日本战国时期的铁炮手图。注意他们不仅仅装备了铁炮，同时也可以装备近战的武士刀和坚固的铠甲。排成方阵的铁炮武士/足轻也有着相当的战斗力。同样的，武田家也有大量的军队是折损在于织田-德川联军的正面肉搏战之时。 6park.com
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日本在战国时期用火绳枪就开发了早期线列步兵的战术了。那么是什么制约了欧洲的线列步兵的发展，直到长蓧之战100多年后才发展出相应的线列步兵战术？在我看来，关窍在于产能。参见我之前的发的铁炮性能考，日本在战国后期铁炮的产能达到巅峰值，例如种子岛作为一个不到500平方公里和小几万人口的小岛藩，在秀吉征朝鲜的时候竟然能年产150挺铁炮。日本资料估计当时日本火绳枪产能占了世界火绳枪产能的1/4，这还只是日本的面积仅和英国相当，人口不到法国1/4，神罗的1/6。在关原之战预计东西军的双方的铁炮数量都超过3000挺，拥有极强的正面火力。在战斗开始就是纯铁炮队相互排队枪毙再才开始步兵推进。对比欧洲长枪与火绳枪的混搭pike and shot直接用到了数十年后的三十年战争。当然我不是说pike and shot的shoot and advance的战术比不上日本战国时代的早期的线列步兵的战术，真要是打起来了谁胜谁负或未易量。但是不可否认的是，日本人在运用线列步兵的经验上是早于欧洲的。 6park.com
最后说明一个问题，线膛枪的出现并没有立即总结燧发枪和步兵线战术。事实上线膛枪（rifle）的发明并没有比燧发枪（musket）晚很多。在17世纪中后期就有的线膛枪使用的记录，尤其是在美国独立战争时期线膛枪已经大量装备于美国民兵了。在拿破仑战争期间，线列步兵还是以燧发枪为主，而线膛枪则用于散兵和猎兵之中。 6park.com
早期的线膛枪相对于燧发枪有着更远的射程和精确度，但是其装填效率却远低于燧发枪。对于线列步兵而言，其输出频率的重要性要远大于输出精度。毕竟线列步兵最大的敌人与对手同样还是线列步兵。面对紧密的站位，即便是较低的精度也可以打中对方。而此时攻击的频率则更为重要。散兵与猎兵的高精度狙击是在自己的步兵“站得妆的前提下才有意义的。否则对方的密集冲锋之下，分散站位的散兵很快就会被包抄而消灭。
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版主:澳贼于2019_01_15 21:51:18编辑